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Abstract 
Human rights violations are becoming a matter of growing concern in areas where extractive 
industry development is occurring. The problem is especially acute in the Global South, 
particularly in Latin America where there has been a mining boom occurring since the late 
1990s, and is leading to escalating conflicts between mines and the communities hosting them. 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become an increasingly applied norm in the extractive 
industry in recent years as companies have faced growing criticisms regarding human rights 
violations. The thesis will examine one tool of CSR – a human rights impact assessment (HRIA) 
and examine the effectiveness of the HRIA conducted by Goldcorp to address the communities’ 
allegations of human rights violations at its Marlin mine in Guatemala.    
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Human rights violations are becoming a matter of growing concern in areas where 
extractive industry development is occurring. The problem is especially acute in the Global 
South, particularly in Latin America where there has been a mining boom occurring since the 
late 1990s, and is leading to escalating conflicts between mines and the communities hosting 
them. According to the Observatory of Mining Conflicts in Latin America (OCMAL), there are 
312 communities in conflict with 218 mining operations as of April 2015.1 Mining companies 
operating in the region, many of them Canadian, have been accused of lax worker safety, poor 
environmental performance and human rights violations, among other transgressions, and these 
have fuelled discontent and conflict and have made for worried investors.2  
Canada is a major player in the resource sector globally.  There are more mining 
corporations listed on its stock exchanges than any other country and the exchange is said to hold 
“the world’s largest source of equity capital for mining, exploration and production both in 
Canada and abroad.”3  Its size, however, seems to be matched only by the criticism which it has 
attracted.  As Dhir noted:  “United Nations treaty monitoring bodies, academics, civil society 
groups, and parliamentarians have all impugned the Canadian extractive sector for the 
deleterious human rights–related repercussions of its overseas operations.”4  
                                                          
1 Observatorio de Conflictos Mineros de América Latina, “Mapa de conflictos mineros, proyectos y empresas 
mineras en América Latina,” Observatorio de Conflictos Mineros de América Latina, 2015, Retrieved April 26, 
2015 from http://basedatos.conflictosmineros.net/ocmal_db/ 
2 Alejandra Martin, “Mining in Latin America: Navigating the Divide Between National Policies and Local 
Opinion,” Business for Social Responsibility, March 11, 2013, Retrieved November 15, 2013, from 
http://www.bsr.org/en/our-insights/bsr-insight-article/mining-in-latin-america-national-policies-local-opinion  
3 Aaron Dhir, “Shareholder Engagement in the Embedded Business Corporation: Investment Activism, Human 
Rights, and TWAIL Discourse,” Business Ethics Quarterly 22 (2012): 104. 
4 Dhir, “Shareholder Engagement,” 104. 
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One of the companies facing such allegations is Montana Exploradora, S.A., a subsidiary 
of Canada’s mining giant, Goldcorp Inc., the world’s second largest gold producer.5 The charges 
stem in particular from developments at the company’s Marlin mine which is located in 
Guatemala’s western highlands, an area steeped in poverty and which is populated primarily by 
indigenous Mayans, a group historically marginalized in the country. Marlin is the first large 
scale mining investment in over 20 years in the country and also the first open pit mine. Since its 
construction in 2004, there have been a series of continuous charges against the mine’s operators 
and owners, including allegations of human rights abuses and violence against community 
members who oppose the operation.   
As tension and protest mounted, so too the concern of Goldcorp’s shareholders, in 
particular its ethical investors amongst whom were the major pension funds in Canada and 
elsewhere.6 Fearing the impact of the escalating tensions on the mine’s economic performance, 
shareholders eventually demanded that the company adopt corrective measures to address the 
situation.  Specifically, they called on the company to conduct an evaluation of the mine’s 
impact on the human rights of the communities. In compliance, Goldcorp commissioned an 
independent human rights impact assessment (HRIA) in 2008 to determine the operations impact 
on community rights and to devise strategies to address any harms done.  This response is seen 
as part of the company’s commitment to corporate social responsibility (CSR) –a voluntary 
commitment by companies to behave in a responsible manner towards society and the 
environment.7 
                                                          
5 Goldcorp, “Students & New Grads,” Goldcorp, Retrieved July 16, 2015, from 
http://www.goldcorp.com/English/Careers/Students-and-New-Grads/  
6 On Common Ground, Human Rights Assessment of Goldcorp’s Marlin Mine (Vancouver: On Common Ground, 
2010), 8. 
7 Ramon Mullerat, “The Global Responsibility of Business,” in in Corporate Social Responsibility: The Corporate 
Governance of the 21st Century, edited by Ramon Mullerat, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International and International 
Bar Association, 2005): 3. 
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In response to demands from shareholders, Goldcorp commissioned the consulting firm 
On Common Ground to undertake an independent HRIA of the mine to determine how the 
operation has affected the human rights of the communities near the operation and to how 
address any violations.8 An HRIA is a relatively new tool to “systematically identify, predict and 
respond to the potential human rights impacts of a business project.”9 This background sets the 
context for this investigation. 
Research Statement 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the effectiveness of the HRIA conducted by 
Goldcorp to address the communities’ allegations of human rights violations at its Marlin mine 
in Guatemala.   The thesis argues that the Goldcorp HRIA did little to deal with community 
concerns over rights violations but instead served the interest of the company and its 
shareholders. 
Methodology  
The methodology selected for this thesis is primarily qualitative and involves engagement 
with a range of sources. This project utilizes primary materials as well as secondary sources. 
Primary materials include government policy reports on CSR and the extractive industry, 
government statements (both Canadian and Guatemalan), international human rights frameworks 
for businesses, United Nations (UN) reports, publications by non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), the On Common Ground’s HRIA report of the Marlin Mine, and Goldcorp’s public 
records regarding its CSR practices.  
                                                          
8 On Common Ground, Human Rights Assessment of Goldcorp’s Marlin Mine: Executive Summary (Vancouver: On 
Common Ground, 2010), 4. 
9 Dhir, “Shareholder Engagement,” 100. 
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Secondary sources employed consist of newspapers, refereed journal articles, books and 
published interviews with mining activists and corporate representatives. The inclusion of 
responses from multiple stakeholders allows for a broad and diverse representation of views.   
Ethics approval was sought, but because no direct interviews were conducted, ethics 
approval was waived. However, I did have to be mindful of certain ethical considerations while 
conducting my research, such as avoiding biases and maintaining transparency in my claims. In 
order to mitigate bias, I examined a wide variety of sources that incorporated a range of interests. 
Ethically, it was important to keep out personal bias regarding any stakeholders involved in the 
process.  
Significance of the Thesis 
The implementation of an HRIA is a relatively new practice.  The HRIA at the Marlin 
mine by Goldcorp is the first of its kind by a corporate entity.  As such, there are only a handful 
of academic, peer reviewed publications on HRIAs and none written specifically on the HRIA at 
the Marlin mine.  This thesis therefore represents a contribution to the field in that it is a case 
study of the Marlin HRIA and its findings have implications for future HRIAs by the private 
sector.  
Organizational Structure  
The thesis is organized into seven chapters. Chapter one is the introduction which 
presents the research statement, the methodology, and structure of the thesis.  
Chapter two is the theoretical framework which draws heavily on Neil Brenner, Jamie 
Peck, and Nik Theodore’s “After Neoliberalization?,” 10  Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell’s 
“Neoliberalizing Space,”11 and, to a lesser extent on  Jamie Peck’s Constructions of Neoliberal 
                                                          
10 Neil Brenner, Jamie Peck, and Nik Theodore, “After Neoliberalization?,” Globalizations, 7, no.3 (2010): 327-345. 
11 Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell, “Neoliberalizing Space,” Antipode (2002): 380-404. 
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Reason,12 and employs their concept of “neoliberalization.” Their articulation of the concept 
helps to explain how human rights protections, previously the responsibility solely of states, are 
now also becoming a private responsibility—that is a responsibility of corporations—and what 
the consequences of this development are.  
Chapter three is an overview of the various rules regimes governing corporate conduct 
and that paved the way for the emergence of HRIAs. 
Chapter four presents the literature review. Given that the HRIA is considered a variant 
of CSR, this chapter surveys the literature on CSR and presents the arguments of its supporters 
and detractors.  
Chapter five provides key background information leading the call for the HRIA. This 
chapter sets the request for the HRIA within the country’s historical, political climate. 
 Chapter six presents the case study of the HRIA conducted by On Common Ground for 
the Marlin mine.  It is the core chapter of the thesis and it provides the analysis on the 
effectiveness of the Goldcorp HRIA in responding to the concerns of the communities affected 
by the mine.  
Lastly, chapter seven is the conclusion and offers suggestions of possible research for the 
future. 
  
                                                          
12 Jamie Peck, Constructions of Neoliberal Reason, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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Chapter 2:  Theoretical Framework 
Human rights impact assessments13 are a relatively new phenomena and as such have not 
been studied extensively.  The few analyses that have been conducted thus far have been of a 
technical nature dealing primarily with methodological issues, as the various articles which 
appeared in a recent issue (2013) of the journal Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal14 
demonstrate.  Thus this chapter will address this gap in the analyses by presenting a theoretical 
framework for understanding this new development.  As noted in Chapter 1, the framework 
draws from Brenner, Peck, and Theodore’s “After Neoliberalization?,”15 Peck and Tickell’s 
“Neoliberalizing Space,”16 and Peck’s Constructions of Neoliberal Reason,17 and utilizes in 
particular their concept of “neoliberalization” which goes beyond a traditional understanding of 
neoliberalism as discussed below.   
Brenner, Peck, and Theodore write that they conceptualize “neoliberalization” (their 
term) as a form of  regulatory restructuring that began in the 1970s…[and that] prioritizes 
market-based, market-oriented, or market-disciplinary responses to regulatory problems…[and 
that] strives to intensify commodification in all realms of social life…”18  It is  generally 
associated with ideas of the Washington Consensus which emphasized market-based solutions 
such as deregulation,  privatization and  liberalization to deal to deal with economic crises.  The 
authors also assert that “neoliberalization represents an historically specific, unevenly developed, 
                                                          
13 HRIAs differ from Social Impact Assessments (SIAs) in that HRIAs look at individual and group rights, while 
SIAs tend to examine a macro-level of rights. See NOMOGAIA and World Resources Institutes’ “The IFC’s ‘Social 
Impact Assessment’ Process: Adequate to Respect Human Rights?” (August 5, 2010) for a discussion about the 
differences between HRIAs and SIAs. 
14 See the journal Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal 31, no. 2 (2013). 
15 Brenner, Peck, and Theodore, “After Neoliberalization?” 
16 Peck and Tickell, “Neoliberalizing Space.” 
17 Peck, Constructions of Neoliberal Reason. 
18 Brenner, Peck, and Theodore, “After Neoliberalization?,” 331. 
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hybrid, patterned tendency of market-disciplinary regulatory restructuring.”19 In other words, 
while they see it as a historically specific process that began in the 1970s (with ideological roots 
in the mid-nineteenth century), they do not see it as a “regime-like” homogenous process but 
rather one that has been implemented unevenly and which is “constantly evolving,” and which 
takes into account  the  context or “inherited politico-institutional arrangements.”20 
“Neoliberalization, according to Peck, “refers to a qualitatively differentiated process, rather than 
to a developmental stage or quantitative threshold; it denotes the form [italics in original] of 
state/economy relations, not a linear path towards a purely free-market state.”21 However, despite 
its being “unevenly develop[ed]” and “hybrid” in nature, Brenner, Peck and Theodore claim that 
the process is also “patterned”  in that each wave of regulatory restructuring lays the foundations 
for the next, taking into consideration the institutional framework within which it is being 
implemented.22  
While the above would seem to indicate that “neoliberalization” is not significantly 
different from neoliberalism, what makes Brenner, Peck and Theodore’s conceptualization of 
“neoliberalization” different is that it incorporates three analytical components which they label: 
regulatory experiments, transnational rule-regimes, and systems of inter-jurisdictional policy 
transfer.23  It is these which provide insights into understanding the emergence of HRIAs as part 
of corporate behaviour, as will be discussed later. 
Regulatory experiments, they explain, are “place-, territory-, and scale-specific projects 
designed to impose…market-disciplinary modalities of governance” and they comprise of both 
                                                          
19 Brenner, Peck and Theodore, “After Neoliberalization?,” 330.  
20 Brenner, Peck, and Theodore, “After Neoliberalization?,” 331. 
21 Peck, Constructions of Neoliberal Reason, 10. 
22 Brenner, Peck, and Theodore, “After Neoliberalization?,” 330. 
23 Brenner, Peck, and Theodore, “After Neoliberalization?,” 335. 
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“destructive” and “creative” moments.24  In the destructive moments, a process of “roll-back” 
occurs whereby regulatory frameworks which are detrimental to the market are eliminated or 
rolled back.  Manifestations of the destructive moments in Latin America and elsewhere, for 
example, can be seen during neoliberalizing period in the 1980s and early 1990s as statist 
policies were eliminated to clear the way for the implementation of more market-friendly 
policies.  To attract foreign capital and to take advantage of their natural endowments such as 
natural resources, states were urged to become more competitive by cutting or eliminating 
policies and regulations, such as high taxes or royalties and restrictive environmental legislations 
which are deemed restrictive to investments, in particular to foreign direct investments.  
International financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF were leaders in directing 
state policies.  Across the globe, and particularly in the developing world, “roll-back” 
neoliberalism was instituted in the name of development.25 Peck and Tickell view “roll-back” 
neoliberalism as the pattern of deregulation and dismantlement which brought about the 
destruction of the Keynesian-welfarist institutions.26 Deregulation, devolution, market 
liberalization, and the retreat of the state from economic and social governance occur when the 
existing economic and social policies are rolled back because they are deemed to be a barrier to 
the circulation of capital.27 This led to politics that were asymmetrical under neoliberalism. Local 
                                                          
24 Brenner, Peck, and Theodore, “After Neoliberalization?,” 335. 
25 For examples, please see: Steven J. Klees, A “Quarter Century of Neoliberal Thinking in Education: 
Misleading Analyses and Failed Policies,” Globalisation, Societies and Education, 6, no.4 (2008): 311-348; Jolie 
Demmers, Alex E Fernández Jilberto, and Barbara Hogenboom, Good Governance in the Era of Global 
Neoliberalism: Conflict and Depolitisation in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa. London: Routledge, 
2004; and Kalim Siddiqui, “Developing Countries’ Experience with Neoliberalism and Globalisation,” Research in 
Applied Economics, 4, no. 4 (2012): 12-37. 
26 Peck and Tickell, “Neoliberalizing Space,” 384; Peck, Constructions of Neoliberal Reason, 22. 
27 Nicole Marie Lindsay, “Mining Industry Associations and CSR Discourse: Mapping the Terrain of Sustainable 
Development Strategies,” in Governance Ecosystems: CSR in the Latin American Mining Sector, edited by Julia 
Sagebien and Nicole Marie Lindsay (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Pages, 2011), 137-138; Peck, Constructions 
of Neoliberal Reason, 22. 
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institutions and actors were given responsibility (decentralization), devoid of power while 
international institutions and actors gained power without responsibility, resulting in a form of 
regulatory dumping which occurred at the local scale, while international macro-rule regimes 
were recreated in regressive and marketized ways.28 It is assumed in neoliberalism, according to 
Peck, that the social and market forces will fill the void left by the retrenched state institutions at 
the local level.29 
In contrast to “roll-back” neoliberalism, “roll-out” neoliberalism focuses on active state-
building, governance building, the re-regulation and “purposeful construction and consolidation 
of neoliberalized state forms, modes of governance, and regulatory relations.”30 This phase 
essentially involves building new structures and foundations that protect the market but also does 
so in a manner that incorporates, at least theoretically, the concerns of progressive forces such as 
environmentalists, and human rights activists amongst others.  Part of this “roll-out” 
neoliberalism, Peck adds, is the “selective empowerment of community organizations and NGOs 
as (flexible, low‐cost, non‐state) service providers, through management by audit and devolved 
governance, to the embrace of public–private partnership,” selective in that the process could 
weed out partners and processes that would could be seen as hindering market forces.31 This 
would, for example, include institutionalizing social and environmental policies in corporate 
operations and establishing CSR programs to deal with the negative impacts of market-led 
development.32 It is in this context that human rights governance regimes, and the resulting 
HRIA can be located.   
                                                          
28 Peck and Tickell, “Neoliberalizing Space,” 386. 
29 Peck, Constructions of Neoliberal Reason, 22. 
30 Peck and Tickell, “Neoliberalizing Space,” 384. 
31 Peck, Constructions of Neoliberal Reason, 23. 
32 Lindsay, “Mining Industry Associations and CSR Discourse,” 138. 
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In “roll-out” neoliberalism, corporations and governments create new mechanisms to 
address “challenges and contradictions of governance in a malmarketized world.”33 In other 
words, they embarked on a process of “regulatory reinvention.”34  This is ironic, as advocates of 
the free-market are foes of corporate regulation, and this begs the question of why they would 
then endorse any restrictions on corporate conduct.   Wacquant provides an answer:   
[the] same parties, politicians, pundits and professors who yesterday mobilized, with 
readily observable success, in support of “less government” as concerns the prerogatives 
of capital and the utilization of labour, are now demanding with every bit as much fervor, 
“more [emphasis in original] government” to mask and contain the deleterious 
consequences, in the lower regions of social space, of the deregulation of wage labor and 
the deterioration of social protection.35   
This reinvention is evident in the second dimension of “neoliberalization” as discussed by 
Brenner, Peck, and Theodore -- that of transnational rule-regimes creation.36 What is interesting 
about this, is that it involves the regulation of private sector conduct, a market strategy to deal 
with challenges.  As they note, these regimes are characterized by the perpetual reanimation of 
regulatory restructuring.37 The strategy is creative in that while the rules regimes purport to 
corporate behaviour, compliance is voluntary—as is consistent with CSR practices. This explains 
why corporations and market advocates would endorse them and why Wacquant so cynically 
dismiss the market pundits who now call for “more government.”   
As discussed in chapter three, the extractive industry has many examples of theses rule-
regimes, including the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, the International 
Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), the Equator Principles, and the Extractive Industry 
                                                          
33 Peck, Constructions of Neoliberal Reason, 24.  
34 Peck and Tickell, “Neoliberalizing Space,” 392. 
35 L. Wacquant, “How Penal Common Sense Comes to Europeans: Notes on the Transatlantic Diffusion of the 
neoliberal doxa,” European Societies 1 (1999): 323, quoted in Peck and Tickell, “Neoliberalizing Space,” 392. 
36 Peck and Tickell, “Neoliberalizing Space,” 392. 
37 Peck and Tickell, “Neoliberalizing Space,” 392. 
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Transparency Initiative (EITI). While the stated goal of these international frameworks is to 
promote good corporate citizenship, all are voluntary in nature so as to ensure private sector 
freedom in the implementation of them.  The HRIA, which is at the centre of this analysis, is part 
of the new wave of rule-regimes being created. 
The third dimension of neoliberalization is systems of inter-jurisdictional policy transfer. 
As Brenner, Peck and Theodore argue, “By establishing certain types of regulatory strategies as 
‘prototypical’, such networks enhance the ideological legitimacy of neoliberal policy templates 
while extending their availability as readily accessible, all-purpose ‘solutions’ to contextually 
specific regulatory problems and crises.”38 The HRIA process is an example of a system of inter-
jurisdictional policy transfer, with it being a tool that can transcend both geographic and 
industrial space. HRIAs are being used in other sectors as a tool of CSR, as a template that can 
be promoted and transferred to other corporations in other sectors. 
This thesis will utilize the theoretical framework of neoliberalization put forth by 
Brenner, Peck, and Theodore, Peck and Tickell, and Peck to argue HRIAs have evolved as a tool 
of CSR to respond to crises facing markets, such as conflict and controversy surrounding the 
Marlin mine. 
 
                                                          
38 Brenner, Peck, and Theodore, “After Neoliberalization?,” 335. 
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Chapter 3: The Global Rules Regimes for Corporations: The Path to the HRIA   
In this section, the regulatory re-invention that characterizes neoliberalization will be 
discussed through a presentation of the various governance regimes that have been created to 
enhance CSR practices in order to address challenges in the extractive sector.  This is necessary 
to show the trajectory that led to the implementation of Goldcorp’s HRIA.   
What these norms reveal is the gradual and growing emphasis on making private entities 
responsible for human rights protections while at the same time ensuring that they maintain their 
market freedoms.  This development reinforces the arguments proposed by Brenner, Peck, and 
Theodore and also Wacquant, that the proliferation of regulations under neoliberalism was, in 
essence, an attempt to give the illusion of oversight of corporate conduct, while ensuring that the 
corporations remain free to operate.   Eleven international governance frameworks to guide 
corporate behaviours predated the HRIA: 1) the United Nations (UN) Code of Conduct,  2) the 
Global Compact, 3) the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights,  4) the ICMM 
Principles, 5) the Kimberley Process, 6) the United Nations Norms,  7) the  Protect, Respect and 
Remedy Framework, 8) the Guiding Principles,  9) the  Equator Principles, 10) the American 
Convention on Human Rights, and 11) the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative.   Many 
corporations have adopted a majority, if not all, of these and have incorporated them as part of 
their CSR programs to demonstrate their commitment to dealing with human rights and other 
concerns over their operations by host communities and others. 
 Prior to the 2000s, most of the governance mechanisms that emerged came in response 
to environmental crises in the extractive sector.  As Coumans argued, the 1990s were 
characterized by a focus on environmental impacts and shifted in the 2000s to an array of social 
13 
 
impacts.39 By 2000, new charges were levelled against the sector, this time, its links to poverty, 
underdevelopment and human rights violations were highlighted.40 As with the earlier phase of 
regime roll-out, the new codes now showcased the industry’s commitment to respecting human 
rights. These codes were what paved the way for human rights protections falling under the 
auspices of the private sector, with the Goldcorp HRIA being an example of how this is 
operationalized at the level of the firm. However, as this thesis argues, using the case of the 
Goldcorp HRIA, there has been little change substantively in reality, in terms of dealing with the 
human rights violations of the mining communities concerned.  
Below a few of these agreements, particularly those pertaining to human rights and 
businesses are explained so as to demonstrate the trend towards making corporations responsible 
for human rights.  The first framework, the United Nations (UN) Code of Conduct for 
Transnational Corporations” (UN Code of Conduct hereafter) was proposed in the 1970s. It 
called for corporations to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms in countries in which 
they operate.  The Code specified that corporations are not to discriminate on basis of sex, race, 
colour, language, and religion, social, national or ethnic origin.41  It also explicitly stated that 
transnational corporations shall disclose to the public all information regarding possible 
hazardous effects of the products they are producing, by means such as proper labelling and 
accurate advertising of goods.42 However, there was much disagreement over this framework; 
                                                          
39 Catherine Coumans, “Whose Development? Mining, Local Resistance, and Development Agendas,” in 
Governance Ecosystems: CSR in the Latin American Mining Sector, edited by Julia Sagebien and Nicole Marie 
Lindsay (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Pages, 2011), 116. 
40 Coumans, “Whose Development?,” 116. 
41 United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations, “United Nations Commission on Transnational 
Corporations: Draft U.N. Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations,” International Legal Materials 22, no. 1 
(January 1983): 195. 
42 United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations, “United Nations Commission on Transnational 
Corporations,” 199. 
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negotiations slowed after more than a decade of disagreement between the Soviet Bloc that 
largely supported the initiative and the industrialized countries who opposed the initiative, and 
the process was officially abandoned in 1992.43 In the context of the times, the Cold War and 
North-South conflict, the project to create an overarching system that would regulate the 
activities of transnational corporations and their relationships with host governments proved too 
ambitious.   
However the efforts to regulate corporate behaviour did not end with the failure of the 
Code.  Later in the decade, in 1999, at the Annual meeting of the World Economic Forum, UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed a new set of norms, the UN Global Compact.44 Bringing 
together civil society and corporations, including a large number from the global south, the 
Global Compact called for environmental protections, the implementation of labour standards, 
and the protection of human rights.45 Two of the ten principles reference human rights: 
businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights; 
and businesses should ensure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.46  
The Global Compact is one of the earliest codes on corporate governance to introduce the 
idea that human rights protections are not solely the responsibility of states and governments, but 
involves the actions of individuals and thus corporations. The logic is that businesses and 
corporations are created by individuals who are bound to respect human rights; therefore 
                                                          
43 John Gerard Ruggie, “Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda,” American Journal of 
International Law 101, no.4 (2007): 819. 
44 Carolin F. Hillemanns, “UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights,” German Law Journal, 4 no.10 (2003): 1066. 
45 United Nations Global Compact, “After the Signature: A Guide to Engagement in the United Nations Global 
Compact,” United National Global Compact Office, January 2012, Retrieved October 19, 2013, from 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/8.1/after_the_signature.pdf, 13. 
46 United Nations Global Compact, “After the Signature.”  
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businesses and corporations are also bound to respect human rights.47 However, one of the major 
criticisms of the Global Compact is that participation in it is merely voluntary and this has 
resulted in only a few companies accepting the framework, ultimately making it ineffective for 
realizing change.48  The Compact is described as “more like a guide dog than a watch dog,” 
focused on dialogue and partnerships rather than having any binding enforcement.49 The Joint 
Inspection Unit of the United Nations System, an independent system-wide evaluation, 
inspection, and investigation unit, stated the Global Compact “has been less successful in making 
business participants translate their commitment into real policy change…in substance it has 
been more output- than impact-oriented.”50 A similar criticism can be made of all the subsequent 
governance regimes also. 
In 2000, the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights were established by the 
United Kingdom, the United States, Norway, the Netherlands, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), and companies in the extractive and energy sectors. The goal was to ensure the security 
of corporate operations and also respect for human rights by corporations.51  Corporations that 
were signatories committed to incorporating human rights protections within the framework of 
their CSR policies and they were guided by the set of voluntary principles contained in the 
agreement.52 Interestingly, while Canada has signed on to the agreement, as have many Canadian 
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companies, one notable absence is Goldcorp, the owner of the Marlin mine, though the company 
claims it is abiding by these principles at its Marlin site.53 While this framework is voluntary in 
nature (and in name), Goldcorp is able to avoid adhering its principles and reporting mechanisms 
and still publicly state  on its website that the company is in compliance with it, despite not being 
a signatory. 
Following the Voluntary Principles was the International Council on Mining and Metals 
(ICMM) which was established in 2001 to represent mining and mineral companies committed 
to sustainable development,54 and Goldcorp is a signatory to this framework.  In 2003, the 
ICMM implemented ten principles which were benchmarked against other global initiatives such 
as the UN Global Compact, the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, and the 
1992 Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development.55 Beginning in 2010, the ICMM 
has conducted annual member performance assessments to evaluate how closely members align 
business decisions within the framework of the ten principles, and members are required to 
provide third-party verifications that their corporations are committed to the principles.56 Finding 
a credible, independent assurance process has been an issue with this framework, particularly a 
verification process that is recognized as legitimate by external stakeholders.57 While companies 
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have to use third-party verification, they get to select the external assurance provider, disclosure 
is limited, and there are no sanctions or repercussions for poor performance.58 
The next governance regime relevant to the issue of human rights is the Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights (also referred to as the Norms) established in 2003 by the UN Sub-Commission 
for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights.59  Hillemans argues the Norms establish an 
authoritative guide on how  CSR should be conducted and she stated that the framework is the 
“first set of comprehensive international human rights norms specifically aimed at and applying 
to transnational corporations and other entities (businesses)” as it makes companies explicitly 
responsible for to human rights and labour rights.60 This framework is different from previous 
ones discussed as “the Norms were drafted in mandatory language and were designed as a basis 
from which a treaty could be negotiated. Had they been adopted, they would have imposed 
binding international human rights obligations directly on corporate actors.”61 The business 
community, represented by the International Organization of Employers and the International 
Chamber of Commerce, opposed the Norms and claimed that it had no legal standing, while 
NGOs welcomed it for recognizing the importance of respecting human rights in the business 
domain.62 Despite the fact “the Norms are in draft form, and were brought before the 
international community with the intention that they would be the subject of amendment, debate 
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and reform,” the framework became quite polarizing, creating two camps: those for human rights 
regulation of business and those against human rights regulation of business.63 They were 
officially abandoned at the UN Commission on Human Rights’ 61st session in 2005.64 
The disagreement over the Norms resulted in the Commission requesting UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan to appoint a special representative to identify and clarify international 
standards and policies pertaining to business and human rights.65  In July 2005, John Ruggie was 
appointed to the position of Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) on human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises for a two-year term to 
address the issue, but his tenure was eventually extended to 2011.  As SRSG, he proposed the 
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework to the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC). This 
framework is centred on three pillars:  
the state duty to protect against human rights abuses  by  third  parties,  including  
business,  through  appropriate  policies,  regulation,  and  adjudication;  the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights, which means to act with due diligence to avoid 
infringing on the rights of others and to address adverse impacts that occur; and greater 
access by victims to effective remedy, both judicial and non-judicial.66  
Annan later tasked Ruggie with operationalizing and promoting the framework. The project 
culminated with the “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the 
United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework” (Guiding Principles), which was 
endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council. The Guiding Principles framework has been 
endorsed by civil society and workers’ organizations, governments, national human rights 
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institutions, investors, and business enterprises and associations.67 The Guiding Principles has 
established an analytical framework of human rights for business, which specifies the 
responsibilities of corporations to respect a broad range of international human rights.68 Key to 
this framework is the process of corporate due diligence, which allows corporations to identify 
and deal with negative human rights impacts from their operations through such mechanisms as a 
HRIA.69 The Guiding Principles differentiate between obligation and responsibility, with the 
latter indicating that businesses should act with due diligence in avoiding infringing on rights, or 
in other words, it imposes on businesses a moral obligation to respect human rights.70 In contrast, 
having a duty suggests an actor (in this case the state) is legally bound to abide by a certain code 
of conduct.71 The framework has become a foundational document for business and human rights 
and was cited by On Common Ground as one of the global norms that guided its HRIA at 
Marlin. 
However, despite the laudable nature of the framework, adherence to it rests on 
voluntarism.  As noted above, the document maintains that states have a “duty” to protect human 
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rights, whereas corporations only have a responsibility.  This requirement is less binding or less 
onerous than that of “duty”, as Human Rights Watch noted.72    
The Equator Principles (EPs) are another set of international norms, with the third 
iteration of the principles launched June 2013.73 This a risk management framework for 
determining, assessing and managing social and environmental risk in projects.74 The framework 
has 81 financial institutions from 36 countries officially adopting the framework.75 These 
members strive to ensure all loans they finance abide by “their internal environmental and social 
policies, procedures and standards for financing projects and will not provide Project 
Finance or Project-Related Corporate Loans to projects where the client will not, or is unable to, 
comply with the EP.”76 The EPs state they “have greatly increased the attention and focus on 
social/community standards and responsibility, including robust standards for indigenous 
peoples, labour standards, and consultation with locally affected communities within the Project 
Finance market.”77 The norms have been criticized for their voluntary nature and have 
questioned whether signatories “are simply paying lip service to the Principles.”78 There is a lack 
of information on the efficacy of the framework, and whether projects negotiated under the EPs 
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have experienced lower levels of conflict.79 The EPs have also been criticized for a lack of 
transparency and lack of accountability in the implementation of the framework, which is a 
criticism that transcends the EPs and is applicable to other frameworks presented in this 
section.80  
The next important norm for the purposes of understanding the genesis of the Goldcorp 
HRIA is the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), which resulted from a call from 
civil society, industry and a global coalition of governments “to improve openness and 
accountable management of revenues from natural resources.”81 It recognizes that resources 
belong to a country’s citizens and poorly managed resource extraction can lead to conflicts. 
Openness and transparency throughout the extraction process can be beneficial to all citizens and 
may mitigate the potential negative effects of resource conflict by strengthening good 
governance and accountability.82  
The EITI is implemented by countries and extractive companies operating in those 
countries and demands that the latter must report how much is paid to governments. The terms of 
the Transparency Initiative stipulate that all extractive companies operating in a country, whether 
they are supporters of the initiative or not, must disclose how much they pay.83 Companies have 
to report what they transfer to governments such as taxes and royalties, while implementing 
countries are required to disclose and publish revenues they receive from the extractive sector. 
These numbers are then to be reconciled by an independent administrator and then published in 
                                                          
79 Goss, “Corporate Social Responsibility,” 199. 
80 Goss, “Corporate Social Responsibility,” 197.  
81 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, “What is the EITI?” Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 
Retrieved June 13, 2014, from http://eiti.org/eiti 
82 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, “Benefits from Implementing EITI,” Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative. Retrieved June 13, 2014, from http://eiti.org/eiti/benefits 
83 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, “Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ),” Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative, Retrieved June 13, 2014, from http://eiti.org/faqs#Standard    
22 
 
an EITI Report.84 Once a country has met the sign-up requirements, they have 2.5 years to meet 
the rest of the compliance requirements before the EITI Board assesses whether they have 
successfully met the full requirements. As the EITI’s states on its website: “To be EITI 
Compliant does not necessarily mean a country's extractive sector is fully transparent, but it 
means there are satisfactory levels of disclosure and openness in the management of the natural 
resources, as well as a functioning process to oversee and improve disclosure.”85 Since 2004, 
more than 40 countries have adopted EITI, with Guatemala becoming an EITI Compliant 
Country on March 19, 2014.86 Goldcorp is a Supporting Company through their membership of 
the ICMM, as all ICMM member companies are also EITI supporting companies.87 EITI 
Supporting Companies “must merely publicly express their support on their website. They are 
also requested, not required, to make a financial contribution to EITI. There are no requirements 
on companies to report in order to attain or maintain the status of Support Company.”88 
Companies can laud themselves as a responsible corporation, a Supporting Company, by simply 
stating their support for the initiative on their website with no repercussions. 
While the stated goals of the EITI are laudable, the implementation of them is not 
guaranteed. In countries such as Guatemala, where corruption is rampant, impunity pervasive 
and state institutions are notorious for their weak or non-existent oversight capacity, it is highly 
doubtful whether revenues, for example, will be reported in a transparent manner. As Deonandan 
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and Ortiz have argued, the reporting practices of the Guatemalan state are opaque.89 Revenues 
from resources are aggregated and as such, it is impossible to determine what revenues were 
received from which operation.90    
 Having presented a brief overview of some of the relevant governance regimes that apply 
to the extractive sector and human rights protections, the next chapter turns to surveying the 
literature on CSR, of which these regimes are a part.  
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Chapter 4: Literature Review: Examining the Debate on Corporate Social Responsibility 
Human Rights Impact Assessments are considered part of the strategy of companies’ 
CSR programs. As such, this chapter represents a review of the literature on CSR in order to 
better understand what scholars have to say about the merits and demerits of CSR. 
Ramon Mullerat, former president of the Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the 
European Union’s defines CSR as a voluntary commitment by companies: 
to respect and protect the interest of a broad range of stakeholders and to contribute to a 
cleaner environment and a better society through active interaction with all. CSR is the 
voluntary commitment by business to manage its role in society in a responsible way. CSR 
is the commitment of business to contribute to sustainable development working with 
employees, their families, the local communities in societies at large to improve their 
quality of life. CSR is cooperation between government, civil society and business (as 
quoted in Shestack, 2005).91 
 
Cochran traces the development of CSR from the 1930s, long before the establishment of any 
global governance regimes for corporations.92 The Vietnam War, in particular, ushered in an era 
of activism by groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that were concerned with 
unethical business behaviour. The ability of these groups to bring media attention to business 
practises they deem irresponsible or unethical can tarnish a company’s reputation and affect its 
profit margins, and hence many businesses were motivated to adopt CSR practices. Cochran 
suggests that companies that engage in CSR may not be successful economically solely because 
of their adoption of CSR principles; however, they should adopt socially responsible activities 
that can advance economic interests and that all their economic decisions should be screened for 
their social utility.93  
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CSR policies have increased and become more prevalent across different industries with 
neoliberalism and globalization, and they are particularly prominent in the resource sector.  
Luning argues that with neoliberalism and the needs of developing states to attract foreign direct 
investment, MNCs’ have increased their authority over the nation-states in the developing world 
in particular.94  This is due to the fact that developing countries’ governments need to court 
companies with favourable policies, such as reductions in taxes and royalties and more lenient 
environmental regulations. In return, it is now expected that transnational corporations take some 
responsibility for community development.95  
Mining companies that were only responsible for the safety and social welfare of their 
employees, are now viewed as having increasing responsibilities that extend into local 
communities. Dashwood, who analyzes CSR from a position of support, reinforces this point in a 
discussion regarding stakeholder theory, which states that companies have responsibilities 
towards a range of stakeholders, including: shareholders, customers, local communities, 
employees, and the environment.96 She suggests that CSR can be understood as being part of the 
obligations that corporations have to their shareholders, which moves away from the traditional 
view of companies only being responsible to their employees.97  
Dashwood also argues since the 1970s it has become increasingly difficult for mining 
companies to treat environmental damage as an externality of the market.98 She contends that 
mining companies themselves have actually shaped global norms with voluntary initiatives such 
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as ICMM. However, she does admit that with voluntary guidelines like the ICMM comes the 
challenge of enforcement. Rarely are there mechanisms set in place to punish non-compliance.99 
Nevertheless, she is a strong supporter of the benefits of CSR practices.  
Burke and Logsdon suggest companies are not only adhering to CSR norms but they may 
even exceed minimum standards prescribed by CSR measures when this offers strategic payoffs 
for the company. By going above the minimum standards, corporations can also increase their 
visibility in the market in a positive way and this will produce economic or strategic benefits for 
them.100 In a similar vein, Hilson argues that corporations then were solely focused on the profit 
motive, and it was not until to the 1980s that the rhetoric of corporate social responsibility was 
embraced by MNCs.101 According to Hilson, the motivations for this move to CSR, especially 
for firms in the resource sector were that: consumer preferences will favour products and 
services that are socially responsible, investors would prefer socially responsible and transparent 
firms, and corporations would be at reduced risk from potential boycotts and safety issues from 
deteriorated company reputation.102  
Other scholars, such as Sagebien, Lindsay, Campbell, Cameron and Smith, contend CSR 
is a response to address social issues that have been historically externalized by private firms. 
Rather than being bound solely to shareholder profit demands, CSR represents a shift to larger 
obligations of responsibility to society and the environment. In order to gain a social license to 
operate, corporations, especially firms in the extractive sector, employ CSR measures to uphold 
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obligations towards stakeholders and shareholders in exchange for doing business in the area.103 
The degree of the impact or successes of such initiatives targeting affected stakeholders depends 
on the interactions of actors outside of the firm as well, including home-state governance 
systems, host-state policies, financial institutions, advocacy NGOs, and host communities.104 
 While scholars such as Dashwood and Burke and Logsdon are CSR advocates, there is a 
large body of the scholarly writing on CSR that is quite critical.  In this strand of the literature, 
corporations are largely vilified as profit-maximizers rather than entities whose practices are 
socially responsible, and their CSR policies are seen largely as facades to respond to 
government, community and shareholder concerns. Among those critical of CSR are Maassarani, 
Drakos and Pajkowska who contend that companies  are not choosing to adopt CSR measures 
purely voluntarily, but rather are acting in response to demands from shareholders, civil society, 
academia, the human rights community and the public for improved corporate behaviour.105 
They recognize that states, as underwriters of international treaties, have assumed primary 
responsibility for the protection and promotion of human rights. Human rights laws have been in 
the domestic domain of courts and legislatures.  However, the authors argue, human rights 
violations that are of greatest concern occur largely in developing states where regulatory 
capacity of the state institutions is weak compared to countries in the Global North.106 Hence, to 
appease critics, corporations have begun to initiate CSR measures to promote human rights in the 
states with fragile institutions. This is problematic for the authors because although corporations 
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commonly speak of CSR, there is often a gap between words and actions.107 As CSR adoption is 
voluntary, the authors allege that some firms may be adopting unenforceable CSR measures to 
improve their “reputation without being bound to their commitments.”108  
Similarly, Slack identifies a gap between companies’ rhetoric and actions regarding 
implementing CSR practices. He suggests that companies have not integrated CSR into business 
models but have merely pledged support for the ideals serving largely as public relations ploy to 
appease shareholders and the general public.109 While it costs companies very little to voice 
support for CSR, their adoption of it creates the illusion that they are making an effort to take 
into account possible abuses, whether relating to human rights or to the environment or any other 
potentially detrimental impacts.110 In a brief reference to Goldcorp’s Marlin operation in 
Guatemala, the author argues that Goldcorp has failed to uphold CSR principles in its actions. 
While the onus is on the Guatemalan Government to hold Goldcorp responsible while operating 
within its borders, the company’s use of CSR has allowed the government to ignore the situation 
while saving face with the international community.111 This case provides an example of a 
corporation’s rhetoric being inconsistent with its actions and this thesis will explore this further 
in its examination of the HRIA done by the company. 
Other CSR critics are Blowfield and Lund-Thomsen who argue that both companies and 
governments have made significant claims about the benefits of CSR, but there are limitations as 
to what it is actually being achieved. Blowfield dismisses CSR as merely a public relations tool 
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and contends there is not enough data on some of the claims being made regarding CSR.112 Some 
of the shortcomings include: mixed methodologies by companies which makes it difficult to find 
aggregate data; organizations that make judgments without fully collecting case-study specific 
data; and corporate reports using heterogeneous methods making it difficult to make 
generalizations or identify trends.113 
For his part by Lund-Thomsen questions whether CSR should be viewed as an ideal and 
if so, whether it should be widespread through the developing world.114  In other words, he 
questions whether its norms can be universally applicable. For example, if a corporation limits 
the work week to 40-hours in a country in which it would be necessary to work 60 hours to 
provide for your family, is that social responsibility?115 To whom are businesses responsible: 
citizens in the host country or those shareholders in the home country? One can see these 
questions debated throughout the literature, with little consensus reached. 
These debates about the effectiveness and applicability notwithstanding, the promotion of 
CSR has gained widespread momentum as now international organizations, including the United 
Nations and international business organizations such as the ICMM that are now promoting 
them.  Of particular relevance to this thesis are those agreements being promoted to enhance 
human rights protections and more specifically, to place human rights protections under the 
corporate umbrella. This development has occurred as a result of the growing conflicts between 
corporations, particularly in the resource sector and the communities which host them.   
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While there has been a proliferation in CSR norms, especially when it comes to human 
rights protections, there has been no movement towards a consensus.  Like CSR generally, 
human rights-related CSR is similarly contentious.  While adherents view them as protecting 
human rights, detractors dismiss the new norms as being driven by the profit motive, as tools to 
“mask the singular profit maximization ethos of corporations by manufacturing the image of the 
vigilant, corporate, human rights campaigner.”116 Or as Graetz and Franks argue, the emerging 
norms of corporations respecting human rights is in contrast to neoliberalism, the dominant 
ideology of the day and which emphasizes market freedoms.117 According to this philosophy, 
whether a corporation is employing CSR due to social expectation, legal obligation or corporate 
voluntarism, its primary responsibility is to its shareholders.  
For his part, Harrison acknowledges HRIAs are a relatively new tool employed by 
corporations and notes that they lack standardization across the field, that there is often 
inadequacy in consultation and participation of stakeholders which then threatens the credibility 
of the assessment.118  
Moving to a more narrowed focus, Sagebien, Lindsay, Campbell, Cameron and Smith tie 
CSR to SGSR Ruggie’s efforts as well as to the Marlin Mine, questioning the actions taken by 
the Canadian subsidiary of Goldcorp, Glamis Gold.119 In the authors’ analysis, they argue that 
while the act of developing and implementing CSR initiatives rests within the domain of the 
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corporation, the principal intent is to advance corporate interests and the degree of the impact or 
successes of such initiatives targeting other stakeholders depends on interactions of actors 
outside of the firm as well.120 The authors put forth that CSR can be thought of as forming part of 
an ecosystem [their term] of relations between different actors, like a spider web, where multiple 
lines can be drawn between different participants, with the corporation making up only one 
relationship.121 There is not necessarily a two-way relationship between each member but 
multiple relationships spanning across the sphere of interactions. In this context, the success or 
failure at of HRIA at the Marlin mine can be attributed not just to the company but also to other 
actors, including the Guatemalan state and international organizations. 
In conclusion, corporations are increasingly viewed as having a role in maintaining and 
protecting human rights; what that role represents is contested throughout academia, business 
and NGOs. This review has surveyed the evolution of several of those relevant to the HRIA such 
as the UN Code of Conduct, the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, and the 
Guiding Principles.  It has also offered a summary of the dominant views in the academic debate 
concerning CSR. As the evaluation of the HRIA will demonstrate, the findings would situate this 
analysis within the literature that criticizes CSR as, in the end, the Goldcorp HRIA benefitted the 
company and the shareholders rather than the communities it was supposedly designed to 
protect.    
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Chapter 5: Community Tensions and the Steps that led to the Authorization of the HRIA 
In order to understand the motivations that led to the HRIA, it is first necessary to present 
a brief background to Guatemala and the problems that communities have with the Marlin mine 
that led to the authorization of the HRIA.  
Guatemala is a nation with a brutal history of civil war and conflict.  The victims have 
historically been the country’s indigenous populations, and they continue to be so under the new 
forms of development which are being implemented. Located on the Central American isthmus, 
Guatemala has a population of 14,920,000, with a large percentage being indigenous. 122  
According to data collected from the CIA World Factbook, the country’s indigenous peoples 
account for more than 0% of the population.123 The country is very poor, with more than half of 
the population living below the national poverty line and it has one of the highest malnutrition 
rates in the world.124 The indigenous population is heavily affected, with 73% living below the 
poverty line, and 22% living in extreme poverty.125 Guatemala has an unequal distribution of 
wealth, with the wealthiest 20% of the population accounting for more than 50% of the country’s 
overall consumption.126 Guatemala’s chief exports include sugar, coffee, petroleum, and precious 
stones and metals.127 
Until 1996, the country was mired in a civil war between the government and the left-
wing guerrillas of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG).  The roots of this 
conflict dated to the 1950s, when the then-progressive military leader Jacobo Arbenz, who was 
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elected President, began the process of implementing land reforms to increase economic growth 
and address the impoverishment of the peasantry.  His policies incited the wrath of the country’s 
landed elite as well as the US government and together these two groups orchestrated a brutal 
coup against Arbenz in 1954, and this laid the foundations for the military’s near total 
domination of Guatemala’s civil and political society for decades to come.  Military rule was 
what set the stage for the emergence of the URNG guerilla movement in the 1960s and the onset 
of 36-year long brutal civil war.  
The most brutal phase of this campaign began in 1982, when the military regime 
commenced an unprecedented counterinsurgency program targeting their opponents, including 
urban intellectuals, labour activists, and of course the guerrillas and the indigenous (the latter 
was believed to be their support base). Up to 150,000 civilians were killed or “disappeared,” over 
one million people displaced, and 200,000 sent into exile.128 More than 440 indigenous villages 
were entirely annihilated with a scorched earth policy which destroyed the traditional peasant 
economy and forms of organization in the process.129 The conflict only came to an end as a result 
of the Peace Accords signed in 1996 by the warring factions, and which was brokered by the 
United Nations.  
The signing of Accords, which took place under a newly elected President, Alvaro Arzu 
(elected in 1995) ended Guatemala’s international pariah status (a result of the brutality of the 
military campaign and the concomitant instability which meant that it was avoided by foreign 
investors). The Peace Accords, therefore, led to the opening up of the economy to foreign 
investors.130 It also led to what Peck and Tickell called “roll-back” neoliberalism. That is, 
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policies and practices detrimental to the operations of the free market were rolled back or 
eliminated. Statist policies, for example, which protected the old agro-export model of 
development, and the landed oligarchy,  were  abolished and were replaced by strategies that 
promoted a free market model which emphasized development based on financial speculation, 
free trade, the privatization of strategic services and the promotion of mega-projects in such 
areas as palm oil production and natural resource exploitation.131     
In this new model of development, power is held by the technocracy and a New Right 
group of free market supporters, of which Arzu, a wealthy businessman was the representative.  
This group pushed for new policies to ensure the success of the market. The new strategies are 
what Peck and Tickell would call “roll-out” neoliberalism.  Therefore under Arzu a series of 
liberalization and deregulation measures were adopted. For example, free trade zones for 
maquila production were created, export incentives and tax breaks were granted, and capital 
controls and import restrictions were lifted.132 This economic openness was reflected in the 
resource sector.   
To attract foreign capital to Guatemala’s mining sector, Arzu implemented a new mining 
legislation that granted significant concessions to mining companies. The new Ley de la Mineria 
(1997 Mining Law) lowered royalty payments from 6% to 1% with half of this going to the state, 
and half going to municipalities, inscribed vague and contradictory environmental regulations, 
granted 10 year tax holiday to investors, allowed a host of exemptions for products imported for 
the mining process as well as 100% foreign ownership of the enterprise and guaranteed the right 
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of corporations to repatriate profits.133 The new law also failed to include consultation of 
indigenous communities whose land was selected for mining operations as a requirement for 
projects to proceed.134 One of the first companies to benefit from these changes was Canada’s 
Glamis Gold, owner of the Marlin mine—the case study of this analysis. 
 In 2006, Glamis Gold was bought by Canada’s mining giant Goldcorp Inc. With this 
purchase Goldcorp acquired the Marlin mine and did so in the year the mine came into 
production. From the onset, however, Marlin has been a source of conflict between the company 
and the communities.   The mine has led to conflicts over several issues: water, consultation, 
security, and the land acquisition process. Firstly, a major reason for resistance to mining relates 
to water, fear of water contamination and competition for water. Communities fear the risk of 
water-related environmental degradation due related to mining activities as gold extraction 
requires the use of cyanide which is environmentally destructive.  Goldcorp has estimated in the 
lifespan of Marlin, the mine will generate 14 million tons of tailings discharge135 and 
communities are concerned about the effects of the tailings discharge on the local river systems, 
their water supply, their environment and their health. 
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Another reason for resistance deals with the issue of consultation.  Many  communities 
claimed that they learned of the arrival of the mine after the mine began construction in 2004 and 
this violated their rights as indigenous peoples as guaranteed them under international standards, 
in particular  the International Labour Convention’s (ILO)169.    This Convention stipulates that 
indigenous populations must be consulted over any development on their territory.136  This 
obligation is reinforced by the fact that Guatemala is a signatory to ILO 169.137   However, in its 
Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA), which by law was conducted before 
construction of the mine, Montana declared that local communities had been consulted regarding 
mining activities.138  This dispute has led to a wave of consultas across the region, where 
community members are holding their own local referendum to vote on whether mining is 
acceptable to them. In almost all these cases, they have voted to reject mining, though their vote 
has no impact in law.139  
Despite the signing of the 1996 Peace Accords, a culture of insecurity and violence 
persist throughout the country, including in the area surrounding Marlin.140 It should be noted 
that the area in which the Marlin mine is located is also one of the regions that experienced 
horrific violence during the civil war. The indigenous communities living here were the target 
for some of the military’s most violent human rights abuses, and thus they are highly sensitive to 
the presence of military or security forces, such as that which guards the mine.  This insecurity 
has been exacerbated by the fact that there have been a number of violent incidents involving 
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community members opposed to the mine and the latter’s security forces.  These incidents 
include violent confrontations during a blockade that saw two mine security managers injured, 
several incidents of violence against community members, including shooting of mine opponents 
by mine security personnel, and intimidation and harassment.141   
In addition since the mine arrived, there has been an increase in alcohol abuse, drug use, 
domestic abuse, prostitution, and an overall increased sense of insecurity.142 One of the reasons 
for the increased social problems is the fact the local men employed at the mine site, now spend 
their income at the local bars and prostitution houses that have opened up near the mine site.  
This in turn has led to increased domestic abuse and other kinds of domestic problems.143   
One of the most contentious issues deals with land.  The On Common Ground assessors 
found local stakeholders interviewed in the HRIA process “expressed the opinion that issues 
associated with land acquisition are at the heart of conflicts related to the mine.”144 Concerns 
regarding the land issue stem from several factors, including that Montana did not provide fair 
compensation to those who sold their land to the mine, that mine personnel used false pretences 
to convince villagers to sell their lands, and that they are threatening, harassing or using violence 
and intimidation against those that are refusing to sell their lands.  
As these conflicts and concerns escalated, and as they were brought to an international 
audience with the support of several NGOs such as Rights Action and MiningWatch Canada, 
they reached the ear of Goldcorp shareholders, particularly the large institutional shareholders 
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such as the pension funds which belong to the socially responsible investing (SRI) group.  The 
latter became very concerned as it needed to assure the investors in its funds that the companies 
in which it is invested are ethical in their conduct.   
Their concern led to their calling on the company to conduct an HRIA. In the following 
section, the process by which the HRIA was authorized will be presented. 
Background to the HRIA 
In February 2008, in the wake of global publicity about the conflict at the Marlin Mine, 
representatives of Goldcorp’s SRI 145 independently organized a trip to the mine to gain an on-
the-ground perspective of what was happening.   The group included representatives from the 
Ethical Funds Company, the Public Service Alliance of Canada (PSAC) Staff Pension Fund, the 
First Swedish National Pension Fund and the Fourth Swedish National Pension Fund. This trip 
arguably began the process that started Goldcorp’s HRIA implementation.  
        Findings from the trip led the shareholder representatives to call on Goldcorp to address 
their human rights concerns. In particular, they called on the company to commission a human 
rights impact assessment of the operations in Guatemala.146 Goldcorp’s Executive Director for 
Central and South America, Eduardo Villacorta, resisted, arguing that the company was not 
consulted, nor contacted when  shareholders were in Guatemala and as such the company had no 
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input into the investigation. 147  In the face of this resistance, Goldcorp SRI shareholders drafted a 
proposal to be presented to the company’s annual general meeting (AGM) in May of 2008 to 
force the company to act. This move was possible under the stipulations of Canadian corporate 
law.  
           There is a shareholder proposal mechanism which grants equity holders the ability to 
compel corporate management to hold a shareholder vote on significant issues. This mechanism 
is not meant to undermine the authority of the boards of directors or corporate management, but 
to allow shareholders an opportunity to hold management accountable to express their views on 
corporate behaviour.148 A shareholder proposal is tool that can be used when “ethical investors 
are becoming nervous” of the actions of their investments.149  
Goldcorp responded to this move by offering to do an HRIA if the shareholder proposal 
was left off the 2008 annual meeting agenda. The SRI group and Goldcorp went through 
extensive discussions over the conditions under which the shareholder proposal resolution would 
be removed from the agenda.  The result was a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), signed 
on March 19, 2008 by Goldcorp, members of the SRI group who had filed the resolution and 
SHARE (Shareholder Association for Research and Education - a representative organization of 
the SRI group), describing the terms of the proposed assessments and creating a Steering 
Committee for the process.150 As Goldcorp had agreed to undertake an HRIA, the shareholder 
proposal was withdrawn. The latter signatories worked together with Goldcorp to design a 
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procedure to address the allegations of human rights abuses at the Marlin mine in Guatemala.   In 
the next chapter, the paper analyzes the effectiveness of the HRIA.   
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Chapter 6:  Analysis of the HRIA 
The previous chapter described the events that led to Goldcorp’s decision to implement an 
HRIA. This chapter is an evaluation of the HRIA through an analysis of the a) process, b) 
implementation and c) outcome. 
A) Process 
From the outset, the HRIA process was deemed by the communities to be flawed and this 
led to their rejection of assessment.  The first criticism of the process concerns a shift in the 
focus. The assessment began as a human rights impact assessment (HRIA) and was completed as 
a human rights compliance assessment (HRCA), but is still popularly referred to as an HRIA (a 
practice followed in this thesis despite the change). While the HRIA was to review the impact of 
the mine on the human rights of the communities, the shift to an HRCA meant that the 
assessment would only look at how the company’s existing policies and procedures affect human 
rights.  In other words, there was a shift in emphasis from the impact on communities to a focus 
on the company and the extent to which it was adhering to recognized human rights standards.  
 The shift was due to several problems. One was the lack of participation of the mining 
affected communities in the whole HRIA design process.  They declined to participate in the 
HRIA because they argued that they, nor their representatives, nor any organization in 
Guatemala were consulted about the shareholder visit to their communities,   about the plan to 
propose an HRIA or about the design of the HRIA structure and format.151  The entities that 
raised concerns about the HRIA, once there was an announcement was made that an agreement 
had been reached between Goldcorp and the SRI groups, came from sources such as NGOs  such 
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as Rights Action, MiningWatch Canada, and the Breaking the Silence (BTS) Network.152 Rights 
Action was the first organization to organize a public response to the arrangement in an open 
letter to both Goldcorp and shareholders on May 1, 2008, suggesting that shareholder statements, 
in particular those issued in their press releases of April 24, 2008 and which praised Goldcorp, 
were unsubstantiated; the organization was joined by a chorus coming from others groups 
reiterating this same point.153 Coumans elaborated on the Rights Action position, writing that,   
Rights Action questioned a statement in the press release that found by agreeing to take 
on the HRIA ‘Goldcorp was behaving responsibly and responding to local concerns 
raised by local stakeholders in Guatemala.’ Rights Action questioned how the SRI group 
could come to this conclusion when they had not asked local people if they wanted a 
HRIA. There is no evidence that local communities had ever included such a demand in 
their various public statements. Rights Action also noted that the SRI group had failed to 
address the ‘clear and authoritative recommendations’ local community members were in 
fact expressing with regard to the mining operations.154  
 
Similarly, the BTS Network was also critical of the assessment due to the lack of 
consultation and participation from local communities’ members in the development of the 
HRIA process.155 One BTS member, also a shareholder in Goldcorp, filed another shareholder 
resolution, in light of ongoing conflicts at Marlin in 2008.156 Goldcorp refused to circulate this 
second proposal that called for the suspension of the expansion of the mines in San Miguel and 
Sipacapa without obtaining free, prior, and informed consent of the local communities. Goldcorp 
avoided giving the proposal to the shareholders for voting because the company argued that the 
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proposal “does not relate in a significant way to the business or affairs of the corporation.”157 
Jantzi-Sustainalytics, an organization which ranks corporations based on their performance in 
several categories, including human rights, commented that the decision to omit the resolution 
from voting as “not reflect[ing] a willingness on the part of the company to engage effectively 
and responsibly with affected communities.”158 In effect, the company’s decision to strike down 
the resolution helped create further distance between the company and the communities by the 
former’s argument that the complaint was not related to the affairs of the company. This 
deflected attention away from the communities and onto the shareholders. 
As the communities did not believe that they were adequately consulted about the HRIA 
process, they declined to participate in it. This had consequences for the focus of the assessment.  
As the assessors argued that “without the inclusion of key stakeholder groups, identification of 
impacts would not be complete and that carrying out the impact assessment as initially designed 
was not feasible.”159 Hence the process shifted from an HRIA to an HRCA. 
The shift to the HRCA meant that the recommendations in the final report reflected the 
assessors’ opinions rather than that of the affected communities.  It also effectively gave control 
to the company because the objective became “to review the potential impact of the presence and 
operation of the Marlin Mine on human rights, relying on a review of company policies, 
practices, and procedures, secondary data analysis and expert sources.160  In other words, it did 
not include the views of community stakeholders, specifically those opposed to the mine as they 
were the ones who refused to participate in the process.  Assessors were mandated to use an 
HRCA tool designed by the Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR) and which measured 
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compliance rather than impacts. What this meant was that the objective now was to assess 
Goldcorp’s compliance with human rights standards as per the various human rights norms 
governing the industry. In essence, the company gained greater control because it could decide 
what documents and information to share with the assessors and when.   
Another problem with the shift to the HRCA, as the assessors acknowledged, was that the 
report’s findings regarding the mine’s impacts on human rights would only be partial due to the 
lack of participation from some stakeholders.161  On Common Ground recognized the 
implications of the absence of community participation and the shift to the HRCA and called on 
the company to undertake greater consultation in the future, stating that:  
due to the shift in focus during the assessment, recommendations for Montana and 
Goldcorp reflect the judgments of the assessment team, rather than affected communities, 
and therefore may not be viewed as appropriate responses. This creates a requirement for 
the company to engage and consult, to the extent that those in the affected communities 
and other stakeholders are willing, before moving forward with an action plan.162 
 
 
 While the process in fact was an HRCA, it is still popularly referred to as an HRIA and 
Goldcorp claims it as such, which is a misrepresentation of the reality, but which benefits the 
company.  On Goldcorp’s website the process is referred to as a human rights assessment (HRA) 
though the Steering Committee’s title is “the Steering Committee for the Human Rights Impact 
Assessment of the Marlin Mine.”163  
Problematic too is the fact that the shareholders agreed to an HRIA, but the framework 
used was an HRCA, a process not approved by the shareholders. In essence, the Steering 
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Committee which authorized the HRCA and which had oversight of the process failed to adhere 
to the agreement. As Goldcorp was present on the Steering Committee, the company was able to 
be present in the process of changing the assessment type and therefore the outcomes of that 
assessment. It demonstrates that the company had control of the assessment outcome from the 
beginning of the HRIA process. 
 Another problem with the process of the assessment was the composition of the Steering 
Committee.   The Committee consisted of  a company representative, David Deisley, the Vice-
President and Legal Director of Goldcorp, a delegate from the shareholder group, Bob Walker 
from the Ethical Fund (he replaced another SRI member, Bill Brassington, who withdrew),  and 
a member,  Manfredo Marroquin, from Guatemalan civil society, the NGO Accion Ciudadana 
(Citizen Action).  What is glaring in this Committee is the absence of representation from the 
affected communities.  Problematic with the Committee too was the fact that it included a 
company executive.  This caused serious concerns amongst community members who charged 
that this brought into question the independence of the assessment and that it  gave the company 
significant influence over the process.164  According to Coumans, Deisley’s participation on the 
Steering Committee “cost the project trust.” 165   
 Aside from composition of the Steering Committee, was the control exerted by Goldcorp 
from the start.  The company was involved in drafting the initial MOU outlining the “goals for 
the HRIA process [and] that included the mine’s continued operation, which alienated many 
community members who saw it as predetermining outcomes and as a setback for their expressed 
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desire to see the mine cease operations.”166 Catherine Coumans, from MiningWatch Canada, 
argues that the only consultants who would accept the conditions laid out by the company would 
be those interested in the contract for the HRIA, but their work would lack of credibility and trust 
amongst the affected communities due to former’s concession to the conditions set by 
Goldcorp.167 Furthermore, since Goldcorp was paying the cost of the HRIA, “it is unlikely that 
consultants would have been hired with which the company was not comfortable.”168 While the 
HRIA process met the company’s and the SRI group’s goals, the communities affected were 
largely left out of the process.169 
  Another problem noted with the HRIA was that the process was paternalistic in many 
ways.   To begin, the majority of the members involved in the oversight process were outsiders, 
not familiar with the community.170 This is significant because those physically removed from 
the situation were making decisions for locals, a fact noted by transnational NGOs, some of 
which are based in Canada.  The Maritimes-Guatemala BTS also contacted the SRI group 
regarding their concern of the “lack of input from, agreement by and participation of the affected 
communities in the development of the HRIA, in membership on the Steering Committee and in 
the selection of the group or individual that will carry out this study.”171 Also concerned with the 
process was MiningWatch Canada. The organization met with SHARE, the representative of the 
SRI group to state their concern the shareholder resolution did not reflect community demands. 
Dhir affirmed the exclusionary nature of the HRIA process writing that,   
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unlike the foreign corporation and foreign investors, [the local communities], those 
whose rights were actually at stake and would be most impacted had ‘no direct role in 
setting the scope and the timelines of the assessment process, nor in selecting assessors 
and peer reviewers, nor in managing the assessment process.’172  
 
This exclusion was viewed by communities in San Miguel where the mine is located, as both 
discriminatory and racist, and they also argued that the shareholder proposals to Goldcorp failed 
to reflect the reality of life in the communities, and that shareholders concerns stopped at the 
level of concern, rather than resulting in action.173  
Recognizing the weaknesses in the HRIA process, one of the SRI member, the PSAC 
Staff Pension Fund that had participated in conducting the on-site investigation and in drafting 
the shareholder resolution, withdrew from the HRIA process.  PSAC cited concerns “about the 
lack of prior consent… [from] the communities regarding the HRIA, and the fact that Goldcorp's 
interests are put before those of the local population.”174 Because of PSAC’s withdrawal, its 
representative on the Steering Committee, Bill Brassington, was replaced with Bob Walker from 
the Ethical Fund. 
Paternalism in the HRIA process was also reflected in the Steering Committee make-up 
which was discussed above.  The composition of this body conveyed a top-down approach to the 
assessment process as it excluded community involvement. Also, paternalism in the process was 
evident by shareholders asking the company to undertake actions and activities with their own 
experts, and by their neglecting to include the local population.175 In fact, the clear divergence 
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between the requests made in the shareholder resolutions and the aims of the community indicate 
a disregard for community input. As Coumans argues, the shareholders, and those working on 
their behalf with the SRI companies “did not appear to have considered whether the resolutions, 
if acted on by a company, may place additional burdens on a community in struggle and even 
compromise its own efforts to achieve environmental, economic, and social goals.”176 For 
example, she noted that the assessment process “appeared to be escalating tensions and 
increasing polarization both among and between the communities and [thus was] undermining 
the conditions for carrying out a participatory human rights impact assessment as intended.”177 
Nevertheless, the process continued thus demonstrating a paternalistic attitude towards 
community concerns by shareholders.  
Comments by one of the Steering Committee members strengthen the arguments of those 
who view the HRIA process as paternalistic.   Bill Brassington (the former shareholder Steering 
Committee member from PSAC) was dismissive of community concerns regarding the process. 
He stated, “In the judgement of the responsible investor group that visited the area in February 
2008 the most appropriate means to address those impacts - the real issues the people and 
communities are experiencing every day - is a human rights impact assessment.”178  While at 
face value his statement may seem well-intentioned, others note the paternalism inherent in it.  
For some scholars, this paternalism is even entrenched in Western corporate law. Aaron 
A. Dhir notes that the effects of Western corporate law may be felt beyond national borders, 
especially when it comes to transnational or multinational corporations from the developed West 
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operating in the Global South.179 The actions of shareholders in Canada and Sweden may be felt 
in the communities surrounding Marlin, be that through submitting a shareholder proposal or a 
MOU to carry out an HRIA that does not guarantee representation from affected local 
communities.  Dhir advocates an inclusive approach that is mindful of affected communities’ 
interests. Any action taken must be viewed as a credible response from those affected, be 
mindful of its own constraints and not exploit the power dynamics present in the relationship 
between shareholders, the corporation, local communities, and other stakeholders, in order to 
avoid it becoming a “civilizing mission” to those in Guatemala.180  
Aside from critiques about paternalism, other charges relate to the ethics of the HRIA 
process that is, utilizing a shareholder proposal that might have negative consequences for 
vulnerable populations.  The Canadian NGO, Rights Action, argued even though the shareholder 
proposal may have been put forward with good intentions, it may result in a “whitewashing 
public relations exercise” that may undermine and harm local indigenous communities’ positions 
and interests while benefiting Goldcorp, their shareholders, and investors.  Similarly, the NGO, 
MiningWatch Canada argued the shareholder proposal “reveals a lack [of] understanding of the 
ethical responsibility to assure that shareholder resolutions that directly impact on locally 
affected communities do not undermine the efforts these communities are engaged in to protect 
their own rights.”181  
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B) Implementation 
This thesis will now shift to an analysis of the implementation of the HRIA.  Here two 
significant problems are identified and discussed: the lack of complete baseline studies and the 
problematic reporting by Goldcorp on its compliance.  
First, part of the problem surrounding the lack of baseline information relates to the 
acquisition process. As Goldcorp acquired Marlin after purchasing Montana Exploradora from 
Glamis Gold, Goldcorp was not involved with the initial project assessments. When acquiring a 
mine in the exploratory phase, a company will assess the profitability of a project. To hedge 
against market volatility mining companies will seek strategic relationships and financial 
resources from a variety of sources, including commercial banks, export development agencies, 
multilateral organizations, and stock and bond markets.182 While social considerations are 
subordinate to those above, such as fiscal feasibility, the company’s actions are dictated by the 
technical and productive requirements of the project and often include (and this is frequently a 
legal requirement) an environmental and social impact assessment.183  These assessments help 
provide baseline studies for future impact assessments.  
Marlin did have an environmental and social impact assessment (ESIA) completed to 
identify baselines markers, but did not have a HRIA done so there were no human rights baseline 
indicators. The EISA proceeded rapidly, beginning in July 2002 and ending in March 2003. It 
was submitted to the Guatemalan Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources in June 2003 
and was approved in September 2003, three years prior to Goldcorp’s acquisition of Glamis Gold 
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and Montana Exploradora.184 E-tech, an NGO that provides environmental technical support to 
communities on environmental impacts of large development projects,185 found the initial ESIA 
had major shortcomings.186 These include a monitoring period too short in duration, not enough 
monitoring locations used, not enough ground water levels used, and a lack of information on 
geochemical testing included in main body.187  
The primary problem relating to a lack of baseline studies for the HRIA is the absence of 
baseline human rights indicators. As there were no human rights indicators collected prior to the 
mine’s operations, it is impossible to adequately measure the impacts of Goldcorp on the local 
communities. The use of a baseline assessment tool in this instance is problematic as once a 
mining project, as in the case of Goldcorp’s Marlin Mine, has already been started it is difficult 
to receive a baseline report of conditions prior to corporate activity or to correct an insufficient or 
incomplete report.  The HRIA was meant to address the challenge of having no previous HRIA 
done at Marlin, though it should be recognized that some of the challenges that were faced 
during the process relate to the fact that this is an “ex post” assessment in an ongoing conflict 
situation.188   
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Overall, the lack of human rights baseline indicators available to the assessors made it 
difficult to determine the true effects of the mine on the local communities.189 This included 
baseline indicators for environmental conditions.  Thus when “complaints began in 2006, 
Montana has denied any potential for responsibility for impacts [and there was no evidence to 
prove otherwise]. While recent studies do not definitively establish that the mine has caused the 
damage, they eliminate all other reasonable explanations.”190 The lack of complete baseline 
studies reinforced Goldcorp’s control as the company could claim whatever it wanted. To be fair, 
the communities could also do the same in their claims against the company. However, physical 
evidence of ailments and the increased potentially toxic metals present in blood and urine add 
credence to community claims.191   
 Claims by both the company and communities cannot adequately be addressed because 
of a lack of information available to corroborate their divergent account of events.  A 2009 
study192 of individuals living in the area found that there was a higher concentration of mercury, 
copper, arsenic, and zinc in urine and lead in the blood of residents who live closer to the mine 
than those further from the mine.193 However, with no baseline study having been completed 
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prior to the mine’s operation neither the communities nor the mine can speak with absolute 
certainty about the mine’s health and environmental impacts.  The communities cannot attribute 
blame to the mine with certainty and the mine cannot deny the charges with certainty.  
Also problematic in the implementation phase is the company’s reporting following the 
release of the HRIA. On Common Ground recommended that Goldcorp provide independent 
assurance of its performance in future reports and to continue to provide Annual Monitoring 
Reports for Marlin regarding its consultation with the communities and the remedies it 
undertakes to address any negative impacts.194 The assessors conclude: 
The assessment is an important step in the development of a system of ongoing due 
diligence for human rights at the Marlin Mine. Some of the next steps are relatively 
straightforward, particularly when an issue is fully within the company’s control. Others 
steps will be more complicated and perseverance will be required to expand consultation 
practices with the project-affected communities, participate in multi-stakeholder 
processes at the national level, and support access to remedies. A significant shift must 
take place in Montana’s openness to consider stakeholder concerns, resolve legacy issues 
and investigate allegations.195 
 
While the assessment team did not include a specific schedule to release updates, they did 
request Annual Monitoring Reports.  
In the first update in October 2010, Goldcorp states, “Goldcorp presents the first in a 
series of regular updates describing the process, challenges, and future expectations as Goldcorp 
implements the recommendations presented in the HRA.”196 However, very soon after, the 
company issued a second report on the HRIA would be the last as it had met its obligations under 
the HRIA.   
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In the second update, in April 2011, the company stated: “Goldcorp does not intend to 
publish further reports on the entirety of the original HRIA.”197 The company went on to say that 
it has “reached the stage in this ongoing undertaking where regular reporting on all of the issues 
raised in the HRA is no longer necessary” but it committed to “continue to report on significant 
initiatives that are underway or in the process of being implemented.”198 Goldcorp asserted that 
“many  of  the  recommendations  have  been  met  and  are  integrated” into Goldcorp’s 
processes, rationalizing Goldcorp’s decision to not continue with regular reporting.199 However, 
the phrase “commits to” appears 65 times in the second update. While declining further updates, 
Goldcorp “strongly reiterate[s their] commitment to always provide open lines of communication 
to all parties who have genuine interest in refining and implementing the many recommendations 
contained in the HRA,” while not giving any concrete examples of what their intentions may 
be.200 
Goldcorp was able to decide how, what, and when to give updates on the HRIA process 
without any enforcement. Arguing that a series of updates would be released, then changing to 
only two releases is problematic as it creates a false impression in their disclosure practices. The 
first update indicated that multiple reports would be released, and yet the second shut down the 
process with little oversight. The company was able to dictate the process and remained in 
control over the implementation of the HRIA. 
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C) Outcomes 
The final sub-section of the HRIA to be analyzed relates to the outcomes of the 
assessment. In the following pages, three criticisms will be discussed to show how Goldcorp 
benefitted from or controlled the HRIA process: the lack of enforcement mechanism for the 
HRIA, the positive publicity garnered by Goldcorp for carrying out the HRIA, and the disregard 
by the company for the recommendations of the assessment team.  
First, at the macro level, the history of companies protecting human rights is problematic 
because of a lack of an enforcement mechanism. As discussed previously, a corporation can 
implement a framework such as the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights without 
formally adopting the measures. This allows the company to benefit from positive press without 
being bound to uphold certain processes. The benefits also extend to the HRIA. Being a 
relatively new tool in the human rights field, only few have such assessments have been done 
(and this is the first by a company)  and thus its limitations have yet to be addressed. One 
problem is the lack of enforcement that results before, during, or upon completion of a HRIA 
process.   
This lack of enforcement of human rights standards is even entrenched at the 
international level and permeates downwards. As argued earlier in this thesis, there is no 
overarching authority to ensure compliance with the global human rights norms at the global 
level, and the HRIA is an offshoot of these norms. Not surprisingly, the tool lacks teeth when it 
comes to enforcement authority. Consequently, Goldcorp is free to implement whichever 
recommendations it wishes, if any, from the report. It is not legally bound to carrying out the 
recommendations and there is no one to enforce the recommendations. 
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Aside from being part of the global human rights norms, the HRIA is also considered to 
be a part of the company’s CSR practices.  But, CSR policies, as with the rights norms, are also 
built on voluntary compliance.  Thus the gap between the intended outcomes and the actual 
outcomes of CSR are vast.  Companies are accused of promoting CSR as a means for gaining a 
“social license to operate”201, that is, to earn legitimacy in certain contexts, particularly areas 
where they may face greater scrutiny,202 as CSR practices in essence, give them control. 
However, as CSR measures are voluntary, they too are “not sufficient to address the social and 
environmental impacts related to mining”203 as the profit motive is likely to override concerns 
about community well-being.  
While the HRIA, like global human rights norms and CSR practices, is plagued with the 
problem of voluntarism, this has not detracted from Goldcorp receiving positive publicity for 
undertaking the assessment.  Goldcorp is now seen as an industry leader when it comes to human 
rights promotions. It is marketing its implementation of the HRIA to promote itself as the 
industry leader when it comes to human rights protections as it was “the first mining company to 
conduct an independent human rights assessment (HRA)…and to make the assessment and its 
recommendations public.”  This despite the fact that its fulfilment of the recommendations are 
fairly shallow—as it issued only two follow up reports. Also, the fact that conflicts with the 
communities are still raging, is an indication of little progress. 
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The company also promotes itself as a human rights leader by asserting its commitments 
to international human rights norms, such as the Global Compact and the ICMM Sustainability 
Development Framework, discussed earlier, as part of its public relations campaign. This despite 
the fact that it is not a signatory to these.  However, as the HRIA is rooted in these norms, 
Goldcorp can argue that it is in compliance with the standards they embody. Keep in mind that 
even becoming a signatory to these, still means that compliance is under the company’s control, 
and despite this fact, Goldcorp still has not signed on to them.  
Goldcorp also gained high praise for engaging with SRI firms. Coumans writes that, 
The relationship Goldcorp entered into with the SRI group in 2008 has been protective of 
the company’s interest in a number of ways. It has provided immediate praise for the 
company’s willingness to undertake the HRA at a time that the company was 
experiencing a lot of international criticism over the Marlin mine. It provided a response 
to ongoing criticism for the duration of the HRA process, even in the face of increased 
local tensions and conflict associated with the HRA itself.”204  
 
Following the release of the HRIA, Goldcorp has been able to use the SRI as an ally to speak on 
its behalf and “to actively thwart efforts by the companies’ critics to further community 
demands.”205  
For their part, the SRI group aligned itself with and defended Goldcorp, a process which 
began soon after the company agreed to the HRIA. Bill Brassington (originally on the Steering 
Committee) stated, “by taking on a Human Rights Impact Assessment (HRIA), Goldcorp is 
behaving responsibly and responding to the concerns raised by local stakeholders in Guatemala. 
Goldcorp is also setting a standard for others in the mining industry - for which they should be 
commended.”  Brassington’s replacement on the Steering Committee said, “We laud Goldcorp 
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for embracing this tool as a foundation for protecting human rights and addressing community 
concerns in Guatemala. We look forward to reviewing the results."206  Helene Regnell, Research 
Director of GES Investment Services, an advisor to First and Fourth Swedish National Pension 
Funds, suggested that, "The outcome of this process could set a precedent for the entire industry 
and is crucial for Guatemala, since the mining industry has rapidly expanded there.”207  Lastly, 
Goldcorp has received praise from the Ethical Funds, which on their website wrote that, “some 
observers who criticized us for remaining engaged with Goldcorp to support the HRIA have 
since begun utilizing and quoting from the assessment report. This is definitely a positive turn of 
events.”208   
This is not really surprising as Coumans explained, as they have convergent interests. She 
wrote that, “engaged SRI firms act out of their self-interested need to assert their ability to effect 
change, protect their investment, and prove to companies such as Goldcorp that they can 
‘manage’ the shareholder activism arena.”209 The SRI firms have to demonstrate to their 
investors that they are engaging with companies and improving the latter’s behaviours on, for 
example, the environmental or human rights fronts. If not “clients may demand that an SRI firm 
simply divest from lucrative corporations if these corporations are causing serious environmental 
and social harm.”210  Evidence of the role they are expected to play can be found on the website 
of one of the SRI member, the Ethical Funds. It uses normative phrases such as “making good 
companies better” and “the power of shareholder action lies not in divesting or avoiding 
companies with poor practices, but by helping to improve them.”211  
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Hence, even though the HRIA did not have a demonstrable effect in alleviating tensions 
or improving human rights, the SRI group is still promoting the process and the shareholder 
engagement that led to it, as a worthy and constructive undertaking.  According to the NGOs 
Rights Action, a leading mining critic, the actions of the SRI group and their praise of Goldcorp 
are really “whitewashing public relations exercise” that undermines and harms local indigenous 
communities’ interests and that benefits Goldcorp, its shareholders and investors.212  
Evidence of the benefits which have accrued to Goldcorp are seen in the fact that the 
company has won numerous industry awards including being named as one of the “Ten Best 
Companies to Work For” by the Financial Post magazine in 2010, installed on the Nasdaq 
Sustainability Index in 2011, and listed on the Dow Jones Sustainability Index North America in 
2012, 213 to name a few.  In 2015, Ian Telfer, the Goldcorp Chairman of the Board, was inducted 
into the Canadian Mining Hall of Fame.   
Linking Theory and Practice 
The final section of this chapter will discuss how the case study of Goldcorp’s HRIA fits 
into the theoretical framework. As Peck and Tickell have posited, protecting the freedom of the 
market is the key objective of neoliberalization.  However, this protection is two-pronged. It 
involves both the dismantling of  regulations (“roll-back” neoliberalism) that hinder the free 
market and also the re-regulation (“roll-out” neoliberalism) when these new regulations are 
deemed beneficial to firms in the marketplace. As was shown in the preceding discussion, the re-
regulation were the various human rights norms that emerged to govern the mining industry 
when it was challenged and criticized by communities who argued that they were being harmed 
by mining operations, and that the firms in the sector were violating their human rights. As a 
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result of these new norms, new strategies were devised to address the criticisms against the 
sector. One of these was a new CSR strategy, the Human Rights Impact Assessment.  
However, all the new re-regulation including the various human rights norms and CSR 
practices are essentially built on the voluntarism principle. Companies decide what, when, where 
and how they will adopt the new regulations. Goldcorp’s HRIA was a form of re-regulation, a 
term that is really a misnomer as these regulations have no enforcement behind them.  Goldcorp 
was able to emerge as a success at the end of the HRIA as it remained in control throughout and 
dictated its structure, and process and even controlled the outcome.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
This thesis examined the effectiveness of HRIAs as a tool for corporations to address 
concerns regarding human rights violations in resource conflicts by analyzing Goldcorp’s Marlin 
mine HRIA. It situated the HRIA as an outcome of the international human rights frameworks 
for businesses, particularly those promoted by SGSR Ruggie, and it assessed the limitations of 
this particular instrument HRIA at address human rights concerns.  
Conflicts in Guatemala’s mining sector, and at the Marlin mine in particular, continue despite 
the HRIA.  This trend shows no signs of abating as the country is eager to attract foreign capital 
to its resource sector and is not likely to impose greater restrictions on it for fear of sending 
mining firms elsewhere.  
This thesis has showed that while HRIAs, in theory, are well intentioned, they need to be 
more enforceable in order to address the concerns of communities hosting mining operations and 
to reduce conflicts. However, HRIAs are a new tool, and research on them is limited. As this 
instrument of CSR becomes more popular and as research on it expands, strategies may emerge 
to render them more effective.  While one may wish that CSR were more substantive in its 
beneficial impacts, following the logic of the authors whose theoretical works guided this 
analysis, Peck, Tickell, Theodore, and HRIAs will not be capable of creating effective, 
meaningful change for communities whose rights have been harmed by mining activities. The 
theoretical framework situates HRIAs as a coming out of a creative moment in time, or during 
“roll-out” neoliberalism, as a new mechanism to address challenges to the market, and are 
designed to ensure that the market operates without too much hindrance. HRIAs, as the theory 
would suggest, are a result of “regulatory reinvention” and part of corporations’ response of CSR 
62 
 
to market crises.214 As CSR is a voluntary response with no enforcement mechanisms in place, 
HRIAs will not be an effective response to crises and will instead create the illusion of a 
meaningful response to address concerns. 
As HRIAs are a newer tool and there is a lack of literature surrounding the topic, further 
research in the wider research area is possible. Potential topics that can be explored further 
include: examining the role companies play in the process, implementation and outcomes of the 
HRIA process; investigating whether shareholder proposal mechanisms is be a valid method to 
encourage (or force) a company into carrying out an HRIA; studying whether HRIAs can be 
effective without being legally binding; and the lasting historical implications on both 
communities and corporations of an HRIA.  
 
 
 
  
                                                          
214 Peck and Tickell, “Neoliberalizing Space,” 392. 
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